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The Fundamentals of
Medicare Demonstrations
Amanda Cassidy, Consultant
OVERVIEW — Demonstrations are experiments that test Medicare policy
changes without permanently changing the Medicare program. They allow
policymakers to learn about the potential impact and operational challenges
of a proposed modification to Medicare, but in a more controlled environment
and on a limited basis. Since demonstrations can affect hundreds of thousands
of beneficiaries and providers and involve millions of dollars, they are often
controversial. This paper describes the basics of Medicare demonstrations,
including what they are, how they are initiated, and why they are undertaken.
The paper also explores the relationship between demonstrations and other
research projects. The primary challenges in designing and implementing
demonstrations and how the results of demonstrations are incorporated into
Medicare are examined. Finally, this document highlights key demonstrations in Medicare history and their impact on the Medicare program.
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Medicare Demonstrations:
Planning for the Future
Demonstrations are real-world tests of new ways of delivering health
care services, paying health care providers, or designing benefits under
Medicare. They act as laboratories for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal agency that runs Medicare, to experiment
with potential changes to the Medicare program. If these innovations
prove their worth, Congress and the administration can make informed
decisions about whether or not to add them to the Medicare program as
a regular part of ongoing operations. (The Medicaid program uses waivers
to allow for innovation in its program as well; for more information, see Cynthia
Shirk, “Shaping Medicaid and SCHIP Through Waivers: The Fundamentals,”
National Health Policy Forum, Background Paper 64, July 22, 2008, available at
www.nhpf.org/pdfs_bp/BP64_MedicaidSCHIP.Waivers_07-22-08.pdf.)

AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMONSTRATIONS
Controversial aspects of Medicare demonstration projects are often in the
news. By their very nature, demonstrations change the status quo of this
very large federal program, affecting beneficiaries, providers, and Medicare expenditures. There is fodder for controversy in what policies are
tested, how demonstrations are designed, which health care providers or
beneficiaries are included or excluded, how much providers are paid, or
how the demonstration results are interpreted and when they are made
available. In many respects, demonstrations are a microcosm of the larger
Medicare program—replete with influential stakeholders, political interests, taxpayer dollars, and beneficiary protection issues.
Demonstrations and the public interest that seems to follow them are not
new to Medicare. Since the demonstration waiver authority was granted in
1967, hundreds of demonstrations have been undertaken. Some have never
gotten off the drawing board and others have failed to reveal better ways to
administer the program. But many have led to some of the most important
changes in Medicare payment and service delivery. The method Medicare
uses to pay hospitals for inpatient care—the inpatient prospective payment
system, or IPPS—is a prime example. Others include the skilled nursing
facility and home health prospective payment systems; the Medicare managed care program, including preferred provider organizations and special
needs plans; durable medical equipment competitive bidding; programs
to improve care for dual-eligible beneficiaries, such as the Program for
All-inclusive Care for the Elderly, or PACE, and social health maintenance
organizations, or SHMOs; the hospice benefit; and Medicare coverage for
heart transplants. Demonstrations can also have an impact beyond the
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Medicare program, as other payers follow Medicare’s lead in adapting their
payment and coverage policies. The IPPS concept, for example, is now used
by many insurers to pay for inpatient hospital services.
Most demonstrations are undertaken for one of two reasons. The first is to
test ideas about potential broad changes to Medicare. The ability to undertake smaller, controlled, experiments before making permanent changes
in a program as large as Medicare helps ensure smoother transitions for
both providers and beneficiaries. A second reason is to evaluate changes
that are targeted to a subgroup of beneficiaries or providers who are not
well served by the current program. In this case, a program-wide change
may not be the right solution. A more targeted approach can be tested and
refined through a demonstration.
Over the years, as Medicare has faced major changes in health care delivery,
financing, or benefits, the results of demonstrations have very often informed
the way the program is updated. Research and demonstrations have provided
Congress and the administration with a better understanding of the policy
tools available to address accelerating growth in health care spending, more
information on how those tools actually work in the Medicare program, and
an estimate of the potential results of implementing those tools programwide. As policymakers nervously eye the depletion of the Medicare Part A
Trust Fund as soon as 2019, the hope is that the demonstration and research
programs being designed and implemented now will yield policy approaches
that can help slow the rate of growth in health spending.

DEMONSTRATION BASICS
A demonstration is applied research that tests the effects of a new policy
approach on Medicare beneficiaries, providers, or program expenditures.
Demonstrations are often limited to one or several geographic areas, or
to a particular subgroup of Medicare providers or beneficiaries. They are
generally time-limited, commonly two years. New policy approaches most
often involve paying for Medicare-covered services in a different way, but
may also involve paying for items or services not otherwise paid for by
Medicare, or allowing health care providers not otherwise providing a
particular Medicare-covered service to do so.
Demonstrations rely on basic research studies to develop the concepts to
be tested, the payment mechanisms to achieve them, and the measures
by which success is evaluated. However, unlike a research project that
does not require gathering data in the field, demonstrations actually
affect the services provided to beneficiaries and adjust the payments to
providers. Demonstrations allow CMS to gain real-world experience with
the proposed changes, but in a controlled manner that provides, at their
best, clear information on which to evaluate the innovations being tested.
The geographic area, the providers, the beneficiary population, and/or
the time period involved can be controlled and changes can be assessed
before larger-scale adoption. They can provide insight into the impact of
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a particular change as well as provide operational knowledge that may inform the agency’s
implementation of other policy changes.

Gainsharing
Demonstrations

The Hospital Gainsharing
Demonstration and the Physician Hospital Collaboration
Demonstration are testing

The focus of Medicare demonstrations tends
to reflect the policy concerns of the day. In
incentives for physicians to provide high-quality and
the 1970s, many demonstrations focused
efficient care. The incentives can include allowing phyon controlling health care cost growth,
including the largest component of costs at
sicians to share in the savings that may accrue to the
the time, inpatient hospital services. In the
hospital, a practice referred to as “gainsharing.” Physi1980s, the majority of projects addressed
cians have significant control over the services provided
either long-term care issues or alternative
in a hospital, but Medicare pays the physician and the
delivery mechanisms, such as prepaid
hospital separately and on different bases for those serhealth plans.1 More recent demonstration
vices: hospitals are paid a fee per case, but physicians are
activity has focused on refinements of existing payment systems. Table 1 (next two
paid per service. Consequently, the financial incentives
pages) highlights examples of recent and
for the two players seem to work in opposition to one
upcoming demonstrations grouped into four
another: hospitals can maximize profits by reducing the
categories: health care quality, alternative
length of patient stays, while physicians can maximize
payment methods, expansion of the program
payments by providing more services such as patient
to cover new provider types or benefits, and
visits. These two demonstrations are testing whether
care coordination and prevention. Quality
models can be developed that will better align incenof care demonstrations are projects that test
methods of collecting data on the quality of
tives for both hospitals and physicians. The goal is to
care provided to beneficiaries, including inimprove efficiency while providing high-quality care
vestments in health information technology,
to beneficiaries.
and evaluate ways to incorporate incentives
to meet quality goals into the Medicare payment systems. Alternative payment methodology demonstrations test new ways to pay providers for services to
Medicare beneficiaries. Demonstrations that expand Medicare benefits or
provider types evaluate the impact on the program of covering services
that are not currently part of the Medicare benefit package. Finally, care
coordination and prevention projects assess ways to better manage the
care provided to beneficiaries (usually those with chronic conditions)
to achieve better outcomes and control spending. While some recent or
upcoming demonstrations may not fall into one of these categories, they
are illustrative of current demonstration themes.
For simplicity, the demonstrations in Table 1 are listed by primary focus.
However, demonstrations can, and very often do, test more than one concept. For example, the Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration and the Physician Hospital Collaboration Demonstration are both quality demonstrations
testing the impact of allowing hospitals to create incentives for physicians to
provide more efficient and higher-quality care. (See text box.) While focused
on quality, these projects must also consider alternative methodologies that
would combine payments for hospitals and physicians.
Continued on p. 8 ä
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Table 1
Examples of Demonstrations by Subject
QUALITY of care
Demonstration Title

Description

Home Health
Pay for Performance

Tests impact of incentive payments funded by savings from reduced use of highercost services on outcome-based quality improvement measures.

Care Management
Performance

Experiments with giving financial incentives to physician practices to report clinical
quality data, meet performance standards, and provide preventive services, with
additional incentives to implement an electronic health record and report the performance data electronically.

Physician Hospital
Collaboration

Evaluates the intermediate and longer-term impact of allowing physicians to share
in the savings from providing more efficient inpatient care.

Health Care Quality

Tests major changes implemented by physician practices, integrated delivery
systems, or regional health consortia intended to improve patient safety, enhance
quality, increase efficiency, and reduce scientific uncertainty and the unwarranted
variation in medical practice.

Premier Hospital
Quality Incentive

Tests impact on quality of care of providing financial incentives to hospitals that
demonstrate high quality in five acute care areas: heart attack, heart failure, pneumonia, coronary artery bypass graft, and hip and knee replacements.

Physician Group
Practice

Tests impact on quality measures of providing incentive payments to physicians
that are allocated based on cost efficiency and performance and are generated from
coordinating care under Parts A and B of Medicare.

Alternative Payment Methods
Demonstration Title

Description

Part D Payment

Provides alternative methods of receiving reinsurance for drug costs above the
“catastrophic” level for Part D plans offering enhanced coverage.

Evaluation of Payment
Demonstrations for
Medicare Part D

Uses alternative weighting methods for calculating the regional low-income
benchmark.

Demonstrations
Serving Those Dually
Eligible for Medicare
and Medicaid

Evaluates impact of combining Medicare and Medicaid funding pools at the health
plan level and different approaches to managing care on expenditures and quality
of care for dual-eligible beneficiaries.

Recovery Audit
Contractors

Tests the cost-effectiveness of additional resources to ensure that correct payments
are made by Medicare.

Rural Community
Hospital

Tests whether reasonable cost reimbursement for certain small rural hospitals
enhances the ability of those hospitals to meet the needs of their communities.
Table 1 — continued >
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Table 1 — Examples of Demonstrations by Subject > continued

New provider types and / or benefits
Demonstration Title

Description

Low Vision
Rehabilitation

Allows for coverage of vision rehabilitation services by additional types of practitioners, such as low-vision therapists, orientation and mobility specialists, and
vision rehabilitation specialists.

Frontier Extended
Stay Clinic

Allows payment for treatment in nonhospital settings of patients who need inpatient care but cannot be transferred to an inpatient facility because of weather
or other circumstances.

Frequent Hemodialysis
Network Clinical Trials

Evaluates impact of covering hemodialysis six times a week rather than the conventional frequency of three times a week.

Medical Adult
Day Care Services

Allows for coverage of services provided in an adult day care center as a substitute
for some home health services.

Rural Hospice

Evaluates the impact of waiving certain requirements for Medicare-approved
hospice providers on access to hospice care in rural areas.

Care coordination and prevention
Demonstration Title

Description

Medicare Health
Support

Tests the impact of disease-management/care-improvement programs on quality,
beneficiary satisfaction, health outcomes, and cost of fee-for-service Medicare
beneficiaries with chronic conditions.

Senior Risk Reduction

Tests the effect on Medicare beneficiaries of health promotion and health management approaches used in the private sector.

Cancer Prevention
and Treatment
Demonstration for Racial
and Ethnic Minorities

Evaluates the impact on racial disparities in the screening, diagnosis and treatment of cancer of providing patient navigator services, such as care coordination,
transportation assistance, and translation services.

Care Management for
High-Cost Beneficiaries

Tests care coordination and management techniques targeted specifically at highcost fee-for-service beneficiaries.

ESRD* Disease
Management

Tests the effectiveness of disease management models and quality incentive payments on care for ESRD beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans that
have partnered with dialysis facilities.

(*End-Stage Renal Disease)

Coordinated Care

Tests the impact on the number of hospitalizations, health status, and health care
costs of different case and disease management approaches to coordinating care
for beneficiaries with complex chronic conditions.

Informatics for
Diabetes Education
and Telemedicine

Evaluates use of telemedicine sessions with case managers to improve primary
and preventative care for diabetes in underserved inner-city and rural areas of
New York.

Source: Centers for Medicare & Mecdicaid Services (CMS), “Demonstration Projects and Evaluation Reports: Medicare Demonstrations,” available at www.cms.hhs.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/MD/list.asp#TopOfPage; and CMS, “Medicare Health Support,” available
at www.cms.hhs.gov/CCIP.
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Continued from p. 5

Demonstrations that do not achieve their primary goals also can be instructive. Indeed, sometimes more can be learned from failure than success, since avoiding costly mistakes is as important as finding solutions
that clearly work. Ideas that do not produce expected results encourage
policymakers to seek other solutions or to reassess how a policy could be
implemented. For example, by the end of 2008 CMS will complete a highprofile pilot, Medicare Health Support, that has been testing methods of
managing care for chronically ill beneficiaries.2 Preliminary evaluations of
the project found that the Medicare program was not saving money, the opportunity for long-term Medicare savings was not evident, and there were
only modest effects on clinical quality indicators, beneficiary compliance,
and self care activities.3 Despite the apparent lack of the hoped-for results,
the final evaluation likely will yield useful insights for future work.
Responsibility for overseeing demonstration projects within CMS is handled
primarily by the Office of Research, Development, and Information.4 This office also is responsible for developing and implementing the agency’s broader
research agenda. CMS relies on research funding to help design, implement,
and evaluate demonstration projects. It also uses research contracts for
other purposes, including gathering and interpreting data and providing
analytical, actuarial, or technical support for CMS activities. A report listing the hundreds of research, demonstration, and evaluation projects CMS
manages each year is available on the the agency’s Web site.5

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN
DEMONSTRATIONS AND RESEARCH
When considering how to evaluate a potential policy option, CMS or
Congress may choose to conduct research, undertake a demonstration, or
both. Research is generally a data-driven enterprise: data are analyzed to
shed light on the policy being evaluated. In general, if sufficient data exist
to examine an issue, policymakers will choose research over a demonstration since it can be less expensive, less complicated, quicker, and avoids
changing the status quo for beneficiaries and providers.
Demonstrations are applied research: they change how Medicare operates
in a geographic area or for a particular group of beneficiaries. Demonstrations most often require some level of research to support their development and to evaluate their results. Indeed, research can be undertaken
without conducting a demonstration, but a demonstration cannot be
undertaken without supporting it with research. Before implementing a
demonstration, CMS uses research to develop and test the methodology
and measures to be used. After a demonstration is completed, an evaluation assesses the impact of the project.
The combination of research and demonstrations has been vital to past
Medicare reforms. One of the most fundamental changes in the Medicare
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program’s history was the shift from cost-based payment to prospective
payment for inpatient hospital services. In developing the IPPS, CMS
(then the Health Care Financing Administration, or HCFA) engaged
in research studies on many technical aspects of the payment system,
including measures of patients’ severity of illness and differences in
hospital wages and other costs. The agency also conducted multiple
demonstrations of key concepts (see text box below for a history of the
use of demonstrations in the development of the IPPS). The development

Development of the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS)
The development of the IPPS is classic Medicare
demonstration work. The prospective payment
demonstration projects identified viable alternatives to cost-based reimbursement and winnowed
out unworkable approaches.
From 1965 until October 1983, hospitals were paid
based on their stated costs of providing care. This
methodology encouraged hospital participation
in the Medicare program but gave providers little
incentive to increase efficiency or reduce costs. If
a hospital’s costs increased, Medicare’s payments
to that hospital went up. Projects to identify alternative approaches to cost reimbursement began
in 1974. The first demonstrations were budget
review programs conducted in Rhode Island,
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina that allowed
payers to prospectively negotiate hospital budgets. While these projects encouraged payers to
focus on cost differences between hospitals, they
quickly showed that each side in the negotiations
had a different understanding of the meaning of
prospective payment, and both payers and hospitals sought retroactive payment adjustments
to reduce their own risk. Within a year, budget
review programs were rejected as impractical for
the Medicare program as a whole.
Pursuit of other alternatives continued through the

late 1970s and early 1980s. A request for proposal
(RFP) released in 1975 resulted in awards to various state agencies and Blue Cross organizations
to test different approaches. These projects were
undertaken in Washington, New York, Massachusetts, Georgia, and New Jersey. The project with
the most significant impact was in New Jersey.
It experimented with prospectively set payment
rates for patients classified with clinically similar
patients into diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). The
IPPS adopted in 1983 closely resembled the New
Jersey model in that both used payments based on
DRGs, and both were systems in which the payment rates were indexed for future inflation.
By 1983, more than 10 years of research and demonstrations related to hospital prospective payment allowed HCFA to identify features it wanted
to include as well as to avoid in a prospective payment system. Demonstration experience showed
that the system needed to account for differences
in patient severity or case-mix, minimize the need
for retroactive adjustments, and maximize incentives to control costs. The DRG-based system was
determined to best meet these needs, and within
the first year it exceeded expectations for reducing
length of stay and extended the solvency of the
Hospital Insurance Trust Fund by a decade.

Source: Alfonso Esposito, “Medicare’s Prospective Payment Demonstration Program,” in Diagnosis-Related Groups: The Effect in New Jersey,
The Potential for the Nation, HCFA Pub. No. 03170, proceedings of a conference sponsored jointly by the New Jersey Department of Health and
the Health Care Financing Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Atlantic City, NJ, November 30–December 2, 1983, pp.
18–24; Allen Dobson et al., “The Future of Medicare Policy Reform: Priorities for Research and Demonstrations,” Health Care Financing Review,
1986 Annual Supplement, pp. 1–3.
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of the prospective payment systems for skilled nursing facilities and home
health agencies also relied on both research and demonstrations. In contrast, development of the physician fee schedule involved research studies
on key aspects of the system, but the fee schedule methodology as a whole
was not tested under a demonstration project.6 Although not always tested
under demonstrations, research funding was used to develop essential
elements of most Medicare payment systems, including the patient classification systems such as resource utilization groups for skilled nursing
facilities and ambulatory payment classifications for hospital outpatient
departments; the risk-adjustment model for Medicare Advantage; and the
resource-based relative value scale for physician services.
In order to respond rapidly to research needs, CMS establishes base
contracts with firms able to perform analyses of Medicare, Medicaid,
and SCHIP issues. These contracts are generally for research, analysis,
demonstration evaluation and survey activities, and are activated through
“task orders”—competitive procurements for specific projects that are open
only to firms that have been awarded base contracts—as CMS identifies
specific research requirements.
CMS’s research budget must accommodate both research studies and
contracts to design and evaluate demonstrations. While the number of
payment systems and Medicare expenditures continues to grow, the CMS
research budget has declined in recent years, from a high of $138 million in
fiscal year (FY) 2001 to a low of roughly $47 million in FY 2008.7 (See Figure
1 on next page and Appendix on p. 26.) Some have suggested that current
funding is insufficient to ensure that policymakers have an adequate stock
of tested ideas for the future.

INITIATION OF MEDICARE DEMONSTRATIONS
Both Congress and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),
usually acting through CMS, may initiate Medicare demonstration projects.
The distribution of congressionally mandated and CMS-initiated projects
has varied over time. In the early 1980s, few projects were mandated by
Congress. This changed over the next decade and congressionally mandated demonstrations became the majority.8 In January 2008, about 60 percent of the 31 current or upcoming demonstrations listed on the agency’s
Web site were legislated by Congress.9

Congressional Mandates
Congress may mandate particular projects or studies when it enacts legislation. By mandating a research study or demonstration, Congress can
test a policy approach or idea that may be premature or inappropriate to
implement on a program-wide basis. Requiring demonstrations or other
research projects signals congressional interest in an area and specifies
Continued on p. 12 ä
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FIGURE 1: CMS Research and Demonstration Funding, FY 2000 – FY 2009
CMS Research Budget FY 2000 – FY 2009
CMS’s total research budget has lacked stability
over the years, making planning for future research
projects challenging. The research budget has been
cut from a high of $138.3 million in FY 2001 to
$46.9 million in FY 2008. The President’s FY 2009
budget proposed a further reduction.
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CMS Research Budget as a Percentage
of Program Management Budget
FY 2000 – FY 2009
Since FY 2001, the CMS research budget has been
declining as a percentage of CMS’s program management budget, from a high of 6.2 percent in FY 2001
to a low of 1.4 percent in FY 2008. The President’s FY
2009 budget proposed lowering the percentage to
1.1 percent. Note: The program management budget
is appropriated annually to carry out the day-to-day
management of CMS functions.

FY 2008 CMS Total Research Budget:
Breakdown of Spending
Only about half of the total research budget
is actually available for new or ongoing projects.
For FY 2008, about half of the total research budget was reserved for congressional earmarks, Real
Choice Systems Change grants, and execution of
the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey.

Research Budget as Percentage
of Program Management Budget
Percent
7.0

6.2%

6.0

4.8%

5.0
4.0
3.0

3.1%

3.1%

3.4%
2.2%

2.9%

2.0

President’s
Budget

1.4%

1.8%

1.0

1.1%

0.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Fiscal Year

2008 TOTAL RESEARCH BUDGET = $46.9 million
[Budget breakdown in millions of dollars]
Real Choice Systems
Change Grants
$9.8
Congressional
Earmarks

$4.9

$7.2

Medicare Current
Beneficiary Survey

Research and
Demonstrations
$25.0

Note: See Appendix (p. 26) for more information on research and demonstration funding.
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Justification of Estimates for Appropriations Committees,” available at www.hhs.gov/
budget/docbudget.htm; Centers for Medicare & Mecdicaid Services, staff communication with author, April 2008.
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Continued from p. 10

topics on which members believe they need more information. In particular, mandated projects can reflect the concerns and future agenda
of the Senate Finance, House Ways and Means, and House Energy and
Commerce Committees, the three authorizing committees that have
specific jurisdiction over the Medicare program. Congressional appetite
for demonstrations and reports is great. For example, in the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA),
Congress mandated 14 demonstrations and requested over 100 reports to
Congress on specific research, implementation of various initiatives, and
evaluations of required demonstrations from HHS, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
(MedPAC), and the Institute of Medicine.
Rather than enacting discrete legislation for demon- Congressionally mandated
strations, the Medicare authorizing committees most
often include them in bills that incorporate more exten- strations are sometimes the
sive changes to the program. Since the authorization political compromise.
for many demonstrations specifies budget neutrality
(that is, they cannot increase Medicare spending), they typically do not
increase the cost of the overall bill and, therefore, spark little opposition by
the members. Also, because the demonstrations are not permanent parts of
the program, the language authorizing them is often not incorporated into
the Social Security Act; it is found only in the statute that is being enacted
(the MMA, for example). Tracking congressional action on demonstrations
and any changes to the statutory authority can be difficult, since not all
of the language related to a particular demonstration can necessarily be
found in one place.

demonresult of

Congressionally mandated demonstrations are sometimes the result of a
political compromise when not all parties can agree on a particular legislative provision. Demonstrations also can jumpstart interest in a policy
solution, sometimes moving forward a compelling but yet unproven approach.10 They can also act as a pressure valve for controversial ideas that
are argued to have merit but may lack widespread support or evidence
of their effectiveness for Medicare nationally. For example, some members of Congress have advocated introducing more competition into the
determination of Medicare payment rates, especially when the program
purchases discrete goods and services, such as durable medical equipment (DME) and clinical laboratory services. However, legislators are far
from agreement on this proposal. A demonstration testing competitive
bidding in limited markets for DME showed it could result in program
savings, and the MMA mandated competitive acquisition of DME in more
areas. Still, the concept remains a topic of debate, and the MMA did not
require its use for additional services. Instead, the legislation mandated
another demonstration applying the same techniques to clinical laboratory services and creating a voluntary competitive acquisition program
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for certain prescription drugs delivered in physician offices and paid for
under Medicare Part B. Most recently, Congress delayed implementation
of competitive acquisition for DME and repealed the clinical laboratory
competitive bidding demonstration in the Medicare Improvements for
Patients and Providers Act of 2008.
Congress also mandates demonstrations in response to the needs of particular constituencies. For example, many members of Congress represent
rural areas and are interested in supporting access to care for rural beneficiaries. Reflecting this interest, the MMA
included three demonstrations on rural health CMS pays careful attention to recommendaissues. The Rural Hospice project evaluates the
tions on the use of research funding included
impact of waiving particular requirements
for Medicare-approved hospice providers in any appropriations bill report.
on access to hospice care in rural areas; the
Rural Community Hospital Demonstration tests whether reasonable cost
reimbursement for certain small rural hospitals enhances the ability of
those hospitals to meet the needs of their communities; and the Frontier
Extended Stay Clinic Demonstration allows payment for care of patients
in nonhospital settings who need inpatient care but cannot be transferred
to an inpatient facility because of weather or other circumstances.
The House and Senate appropriations committees also seek to influence
the selection and implementation of Medicare projects. The appropriations committees may encourage CMS to undertake certain projects by
indicating their support in the conference report accompanying the
Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations bill.
Although report language does not have the same weight as a statutory
mandate, CMS pays careful attention to recommendations on the use of
research funding included in any appropriations bill report. Appropriators can be extremely specific in identifying their preferred projects,
commonly referred to as “earmarks.” Appropriations bills have also
included language that prohibits CMS from spending money to implement certain demonstrations, thereby delaying or possibly ending a
demonstration. Such action can be seen as infringing on the jurisdiction
of the authorizing committees, which, by the rules of the House and
Senate, have responsibility for handling the substantive policy issues
facing the program.11
In addition to requiring new projects or studies, Congress may choose to
extend existing projects (whether statutorily mandated or initiated by CMS)
beyond their original time frame. In particular, Congress may act when a
demonstration enjoys strong support from the providers or beneficiaries
involved but expansion of the concept being tested is unlikely because, for
example, savings goals were not reached. In the case of the Municipal Health
Services Demonstration, Congress acted eight times to extend the project.
This demonstration tested whether or not elimination of copayments and deductibles, and offering incentives such as eyeglasses and prescription drugs)
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at municipal health centers could reduce utilization of hospital inpatient
and emergency department services. Begun in 1978, the demonstration ran
through 2006, well beyond its original timeframe of five years.12

HHS Initiatives
HHS has authority to initiate demonstration projects under section 402 of
the Social Security Amendments of 1967. The section 402 authority allows
the Secretary of HHS to determine whether efficiency or economy of health
services is increased if changes are made in the method of payment or if
services are covered other than those for which payment may already be
made under Medicare.13 Statutory authority limits CMS-initiated demonstrations to changes in methods of payment.
CMS can use its demonstration authority to signal the administration’s
intent to pursue a particular approach without waiting for the legislative
process to produce a congressional mandate. For example, using demonstration projects that gathered voluntarily provided performance data,
CMS laid the groundwork for quality incentive programs that reward
physicians and providers for meeting performance goals. Congress then
built on those initiatives and provided for payment adjustments to hospitals
and physicians who participated.14
Since they lack a congressional directive, projects initiated under this authority may be subject to more intense scrutiny by Congress and other observers such as MedPAC and GAO. Questions may be raised as to whether
such demonstrations appropriately exercise the section 402 authority and
whether the program and administrative resources needed to administer the demonstration were properly used. Recent CMS demonstrations
under Part D and for oncology services under Part B are not limited to a
specific geographic area but rather adjust payments nationally for certain
plans or services. Under the Part D demonstrations, CMS changed the
methodology for calculating the Part D premium for low-income beneficiaries and allowed all prescription drug plan sponsors who intended to
offer supplemental drug benefits to choose an alternative to the standard
method for determining when a beneficiary would qualify for catastrophic
coverage. Under the oncology demonstration, Medicare made an additional
payment to oncologists for submitting quality of life or patient care data.
CMS has been criticized for these atypical demonstrations, which are seen
as attempts to use the demonstration authority to make widespread payment or policy adjustments without intending to gather data to explore a
particular policy option.15
In addition to the demonstration authority, section 1110 of the Social Security
Act provides the Secretary with the authority to make grants that pay for
research projects to improve the administration and effectiveness of CMS
programs, including Medicare. Grants CMS has funded in the past include
unsolicited projects that are suggested by the public. However, the agency
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notes that there has been a sharp reduction in research grants in recent
years, and unsolicited proposals are unlikely to be funded.16

KEY ISSUES
There are a number of key issues to consider in designing, implementing,
and evaluating Medicare demonstrations.

Time Required
Designing and implementing demonstrations is a multistep process that
can take from months to years to complete. First, a demonstration model is
developed by CMS staff with input from experts on the relevant subject. The
input may be through informal consultation, advisory panels, or a formal
federal contract for development design. The design
must incorporate the data needs of the project’s evalu- Designing and implementing demonstraation as well as address how the Medicare claims processing systems will be able to identify and correctly tions is a multistep process that can take
process claims under the demonstration model. CMS from months to years to complete.
must work with HHS and OMB staff to get approval
for the proposed project. The public is then notified of the demonstration
and participants recruited through a notice in the Federal Register and on the
CMS Web site, a press release, outreach to relevant provider organizations,
or mailings to potential applicants. Demonstration participants (health care
providers and/or beneficiaries) are selected, consistent with the requirements of the demonstration, and the participants are given adequate lead
time to plan for and implement the demonstration. The demonstration
then is operational for a period of between one and five years, depending
on the mandate and study design. Interim evaluations may be conducted
during the demonstration, and an overall evaluation is conducted after the
demonstration is completed. A one-year demonstration typically takes at
least three years to complete, with one year for design and solicitation of
participants, one year for operation, and one year for evaluation.17 Many
demonstrations also involve a refinement stage, in which results are used
to refine policies or operational aspects to further hone the policy or how it
is implemented. Figure 2 (next page), highlights the life cycle of three major
demonstrations: IPPS, skilled nursing facility prospective payment system,
and competitive bidding for durable medical equipment.
As Figure 2 indicates, significant lead time often is necessary to adequately
research, design, implement, and evaluate a demonstration. The time
required to carry out a demonstration may offset the usefulness of the
lessons learned through the project. For example, Section 623 of the MMA
mandated a report to Congress on a bundled payment system for end-stage
renal disease as well as a three-year demonstration of the concept. In its
report, CMS noted the delay the demonstration would cause in implementing a national bundled payment system and cited reasons that running the
demonstration concurrent with implementing a bundled system would be
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FIGURE 2: Life Cycle of Demonstrations: Research, Demonstration, and Refinement Phases
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* Durable Medical Equipment was originally scheduled to be implemented July 1, 2008 but was delayed 18 months by the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008.
Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Master Demonstration, Evaluation and Research Studies System of Record Project List found
at www.cms.hhs.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts; and CMS staff communication with the author, July 2008.

inappropriate. As an alternative, the agency has suggested going ahead
with a national system without the demonstration and monitoring the
experience of beneficiaries and providers.18 Given the need for tested ideas
as policymakers consider proposals to avoid exhaustion of the Medicare
Part A Trust Fund in 2019 and the relatively long lead time necessary to
undertake demonstrations, some experts believe that current investments
in research and demonstrations are insufficient.

Changes to the Status Quo
There is no disputing that demonstrations upset the status quo. CMS uses
its demonstration authority to waive specific provisions of law or regulation to pay a subset of providers or organizations differently from other
like providers or organizations in order to test a program innovation and
evaluate the results. Although the Medicare waiver authority has not generally been used to make the broad changes that are permitted under the
Medicaid waiver authority,19 by their very nature Medicare demonstrations
require payment policies that are different from the Medicare standard.
Demonstrations may cause controversy because, while some providers or
beneficiaries may benefit from the approach being tested, others may be
adversely affected (or fear being adversely affected). In some instances,
Congress has put additional requirements on or even prevented implementation of controversial demonstrations. For example, in the BBA, Congress
mandated a competitive bidding demonstration for managed care plans

National Health Policy Forum | www.nhpf.org

16

Background Paper – No. 63
July 22, 2008

after unsuccessful attempts to implement HCFA-initiated demonstrations
in Baltimore and Denver. Following objection by local plans and providers in Kansas City and Phoenix, the two sites selected for the mandated
demonstration, Congress delayed the project and placed additional requirements for its implementation, effectively ending the demonstration.20
In other instances, the courts have been asked to intervene to determine
whether a demonstration is an appropriate use of CMS or congressional
authority or whether processes for awarding contracts are correct. For
example, a permanent injunction in April 2004 halted activity on a gainsharing demonstration in New Jersey after the court determined that
CMS did not have authority to waive civil monetary penalties as needed
to permit gainsharing.21 Congress later provided explicit authority for a
similar demonstration in the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act. More recently, in
April 2008, a federal court issued a preliminary injunction halting implementation of the clinical laboratory competitive bidding demonstration
in San Diego because HHS had not gone through the rulemaking process
in designing the demonstration.
CMS attempts to mitigate the negative impact of demonstrations on beneficiaries, if possible. For example, in the DME competitive bidding demonstration, CMS included an ombudsman who responded to questions and
investigated complaints from beneficiaries, physicians, and suppliers. In
the hospital gainsharing demonstration, CMS has instituted continuous
monitoring to ensure that the quality of care provided to beneficiaries
under the demonstration is not compromised.
Whatever the difficulty of incorporating change through a demonstration
project, it pales in comparison to upsetting the status quo in the Medicare
program as a whole. By identifying necessary refinements to or limitations
of an approach before it affects beneficiaries and providers nationwide, CMS
hopes to reduce the inevitable turmoil associated with such change.

Budget Neutrality
Congress requires most mandated demonstrations to be budget neutral,
which means that the demonstration must be designed so that total benefit
payments under the demonstration are expected to be no more than expenditures would be under the existing payment or coverage requirements.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approval authority for
both mandated and CMS-initiated demonstrations and requires CMSinitiated projects to be budget neutral. 22 Some demonstrations are actually required to show a reduction in program expenditures. For example,
participating organizations in the Disease Management Demonstration
mandated by Section 121 of the Benefit Improvement and Protection Act of
2000 (BIPA) were required by law to reduce Medicare spending, although
no specific savings target was mandated. CMS also sought program savings
under the Medicare Health Support projects but revised the targets to be
budget neutral when anticipated savings did not occur.
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The method of reaching budget neutrality varies from demonstration to
demonstration, depending on design, and must be approved by OMB. In
some cases, the participating health care providers or organizations agree
to put a portion of their payments at risk to ensure that the project does not
increase spending. The BIPA Disease Management demonstration covered
both disease management services and prescription drug costs (prior to
the existence of Medicare Part D), and participating organizations had to
assume the risk if the project did not reduce Medicare expenditures.23 Such
an approach is relatively rare and can be a disincentive for providers or
organizations to participate.

Demonstrations are
typically designed
to offset anticipated
costs with anticipated
savings.

Demonstrations are typically designed to offset anticipated costs with
anticipated savings. Assumptions of costs and savings are based on
available evidence, which may be limited, particularly for the savings assumptions. The implication of failing to achieve assumed savings varies
among demonstrations. In some cases, such as the Physician Group Practice
Demonstration and the Home Health Pay for Performance Demonstration,
incentive payments included in the demonstration design are not awarded
if the participating organization does not generate sufficient savings. In
other cases, increased payments under the demonstration are offset by
reducing payments for the type of provider nationally. The Expansion of
Coverage of Chiropractic Services Demonstration mandated by Section 651
of the MMA allowed coverage in four sites for services that chiropractors
could provide under their licensure but which had not previously been
covered by Medicare. The demonstration tested whether coverage of
such services would reduce Medicare spending on other services, such as
hospital or physician care. The law requires that expenditures under the
demonstration not exceed what expenditures would have been without
the demonstration. If the demonstration is shown to increase spending
over its two-year duration, payments for all chiropractor services nationally will be reduced to make up the difference.24
In many instances, though, higher-than-expected costs or lower-thanexpected savings under a demonstration are not recouped. Instead, such
experience is considered during the evaluation of the project and the
decision about whether to adopt the proposed approach more widely. In
developing the Medicare Health Support program, for example, CMS established a five percent savings threshold for participating organizations
in the pilot phase of the program. As noted, participants had difficulty
achieving the target savings and asked that the standard be adjusted to be
budget neutral. Ultimately though, according to CMS, costs for the projects
were between 5 percent and 11 percent greater than they would have been,
absent the intervention. CMS is ending the current projects as scheduled
and will determine whether to exercise its authority to implement a second
phase of the project following completion of the Phase I evaluation.25
When estimating budget neutrality for a demonstration, CMS typically
looks at total expenditures, not just payments for a certain type of provider.
Additional expenditures on a specific provider or supplier type may be
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expected to be offset by reduced expenditures in other areas, allowing
the demonstration to meet the requirements for budget neutrality. Such a
calculation cannot occur under most Medicare payment systems, which
are required to be budget neutral within the payments for a specific type
of provider. For example, increased spending on physicians for certain
services that may reduce expenditures on inpatient hospital care must
be offset by reduction in payment for other
services under the physician fee schedule, Demonstrations are collaborations between
without consideration of the reduced inpatient
spending. However, the current application of CMS, providers, suppliers and organizations,
budget neutrality has also been criticized for and Medicare beneficiaries.
its narrowness. The calculation of whether a
project is budget neutral is determined from results over the relatively
short duration of the demonstration and therefore does not account for
potential long-term savings from some interventions. In addition, budget
neutrality does not generally recognize savings to other federally funded
programs, including Medicaid, and it does not take into consideration the
quality of the services being purchased.26

Voluntary Provider and Beneficiary Participation
Generally voluntary in nature, demonstrations are collaborations between
CMS, health care providers, suppliers and organizations, and Medicare
beneficiaries. CMS designs a project and hopes that practitioners, providers, and plans as well as beneficiaries will want to participate. In some
instances, such as the disease management demonstrations, the demonstration organizations recruit from pools of eligible beneficiaries to identify
participants. In other cases, such as the Acute Care Episode Demonstration,
selected hospitals are paid under the demonstration for all beneficiaries
treated at the hospital who meet the demonstration qualifications and must
only notify beneficiaries of the hospital’s participation in the demonstration. Competitive bidding demonstrations, such as those for health plans,
durable medical equipment, and laboratory services, are the exception
to the voluntary nature of demonstrations. These typically require that
beneficiaries within the geographic area of the demonstration purchase
items or services only from the suppliers selected for participation in the
project. Some demonstrations have not been fully implemented because
plans or providers have not wanted to offer the services provided under
the demonstration or because beneficiary enrollment has been limited. For
example, the Medical Savings Account demonstration was designed to test
a new product that would combine a high-deductible health plan with a
personal health account to be used for out-of-pocket costs, but organization initially was willing to offer the product.27 The Lifestyle Modification
Demonstration sought to test the impact of programs including intense
nutrition and stress-reduction interventions on beneficiaries with moderate
to severe coronary artery disease. Although the project included 16 sites,
fewer than 600 beneficiaries enrolled over six years.28
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Evaluation
Most mandated demonstrations require an evaluation and report to
Congress on recommendations regarding the proposed approach. CMS
also evaluates agency-initiated demonstrations. The agency contracts out
evaluation reports through task order contracts with research firms, and
the evaluation design is often developed at the same time the demonstration itself is being developed.
Evaluators strive for the highest quality research design in assessing demonstrations, with comparability between experimental and control groups
and sufficient data to control for other factors that may affect outcomes.
However, designing and implementing such a study can be expensive
and time-consuming.29 The dynamic nature of demonstrations can also
complicate such an evaluation, which is designed to gather data from
a specific experiment with a particular design. If the demonstration is
adapted to respond to unanticipated events, the data gathered change and
the evaluation must adapt, potentially causing further delays in analyzing
and reporting on the effects of the demonstration.30
Not all demonstration evaluations reach this exacting standard in their
design. Isolating the specific impact of multiple (and often simultaneous)
interventions can be difficult, if not impossible. There is also a tension
between the desire for comprehensive evaluations that take into consideration a range of impacts, including the long-term effects of a change,
and the need to produce timely and meaningful results. Observers have
suggested ways to accelerate the evaluation process, including continuous monitoring of demonstration projects or use of alternative models
that allow rapid-cycle feedback on change to expedite incorporation of
demonstration findings into consideration of policy changes.31 CMS has
recently incorporated some of these approaches into its evaluation of the
disease management demonstrations.

INCORPORATION OF RESULTS INTO MEDICARE
While designing, implementing, and evaluating demonstrations often can
be a challenge for CMS, providers, and beneficiaries, few contest that the
research, policy, and operational knowledge gained is worth the effort.
Former HCFA officials have bluntly stated the value of demonstrations
in an article on the agency’s experience with the competitive bidding
demonstration: “We know that it is difficult to change Medicare, but it is
worse to do so without testing new ideas.”32 A major hurdle in modifying Medicare can be the lack of a mechanism, other than a change in the
statute, for incorporating successful demonstration approaches into the
program nationwide.
In some instances, the demonstration project provides evidence that
can be utilized in the Medicare coverage process to determine what
treatments are medically reasonable and necessary. These instances,
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Figure 3
Adopting Change Under Medicare: Years in the Life of Competitive
Acquisition of Durable Medical Equipment
January
2010*
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such as the Lifestyle Modification Demonstration, are relatively rare,
however, since the treatment being evaluated must be coverable under
existing Medicare law. There is often no mechanism that allows CMS to
apply more broadly many of its findings from demonstrations. While the
administration can include proposals in the President’s budget to incorporate successful approaches into the program, Congress must act for most
payment or coverage changes to be adopted. An exception is Medicare
Health Support, which Congress authorized the Secretary to implement in
two phases. Although it appears unlikely from preliminary indications, if
the evaluation following the first phase indicates that the program met the
conditions of improving quality of care and beneficiary satisfaction and
reached savings targets, the Secretary is required to expand geographic
implementation of the program and could implement it on a national basis
without further action from Congress.
Without a mechanism for incorporation into the larger program, demonstrations can frustrate proponents of an approach who are skeptical that
their idea will be more generally utilized.33 Even when Congress acts in
a prompt fashion in response to demonstration findings, the process of
incorporating input from demonstrations into the program can be lengthy.
For example, more than ten years passed between the time the competitive bid demonstration was mandated by the BBA and implementation of
competitive acquisition for DME (Figure 3).
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on demo
submitted to
Congress

Implementation
begins

BBA — Balanced Budget Act of 1997
DME — Durable Medical Equipment
MMA — Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement and Modernization Act
of 2003
*Originally scheduled to be implemented July
1, 2008 but was delayed 18 months by the
Medicare Improvements for Patients and
Providers Act of 2008.
Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMS), “First Annual Report to
Congress: Evaluation of Medicare’s Competitive Bidding Demonstration For Durable
Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics,
and Supplies,” November 30, 2000, and CMS,
“Final Report to Congress: Evaluation of Medicare’s Competitive Bidding Demonstration
For Durable Medical Equipment, Prosthetics,
Orthotics, and Supplies.” 2004; both available
at www.cms.hhs.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/
MD/itemdetail.asp?filterType=dual,%20keyw
ord&filterValue=DME&filterByDID=0&sort
ByDID=3&sortOrder=descending&itemID=
CMS063474&intNumPerPage=10.

As noted, the time required to complete and assess a demonstration often
does not keep pace with congressional demands for making program
changes. As the DME competitive acquisition timeline shows, Congress
does not always wait for the demonstration evaluations to be completed
before acting. In some instances, Congress has adopted approaches being tested under demonstrations before those demonstrations have even
been fully operational, much less evaluated. For example, the Medicare
Choices Demonstration tested methods for offering new types of managed care products under Medicare and alternative risk-based payments
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for managed care. The earliest enrollment in a plan under the demonstration was in February 1997, with most enrollment beginning in spring and
summer of that year. However, when Congress passed the BBA in August
1997, it adopted for the larger Medicare managed care program many of
the methods being tested under the Choices demonstration.34
Even absent an incorporating mechanism, demonstrations still provide
CMS with valuable operational experience that can often be applied in
other instances. And the issues faced in implementing and evaluating
a project may continue to be relevant as future demonstrations are developed. For example, the Medicare Participating Heart Bypass Center
Demonstration was completed in 1996 and showed that the design, which
made a global payment for both hospital and physician care for coronary
artery bypass graft surgery, could reduce costs and improve quality.
However, participating hospitals did not see an anticipated increase in
their market share and the concept was shelved. Interest in this idea has
been renewed and CMS is soliciting participants for a related project, the
Acute Care Episode Demonstration, that incorporates competitive bidding
into the design.35

The goal of demonstration projects is to
provide policymakers
with the tools they
need to improve the
Medicare program.

Over time, demonstration projects have shifted from broad experiments
in restructuring the way the Medicare program pays for services to more
subtle refinements of those restructured payment systems. No matter the
specific focus, the overall goal of demonstration projects is to provide
congressional and administration policymakers with the tools they need
to update and improve the Medicare program. Concern that projects may
not be meeting this overarching goal has been fairly constant over the
history of demonstrations. In 1980, the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight held a hearing on the relevance and usefulness of the
Medicare research and demonstrations projects, the timeliness of reports
and feedback to Congress on those projects, the quality of the evaluation
of demonstration projects, and the dissemination of demonstration results.36 Members emphasized that the issues in this hearing were similar
to those raised in a 1976 hearing,37 and similar complaints about Medicare
demonstrations are heard today.38
The frustration with demonstration projects occurs in part because of the
complexity of the issues involved and the importance of resolving the
ongoing dilemmas in Medicare. Congress needs assistance to identify solutions for these problems and expects demonstration projects to expand its
knowledge in a meaningful way. However, as the saying goes, “hindsight
is 20/20.” It is easier to identify projects that are not productive after the
fact than before they are implemented. It can also be difficult to identify
which project will be the most successful or important until many years
after the project is completed and the innovations are incorporated into
Medicare. The 1980 Subcommitte on Oversight hearing, for example, occurred at the same time that the demonstrations leading to the IPPS were
getting under way.
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CONCLUSION
Medicare’s coverage and payment policies not only apply to the care
received by the program’s 44 million beneficiaries but also are often the
standard other insurers use to determine their own coverage and payment
practices. Changes to Medicare policies therefore can have a significant and
far-ranging impact on health care practice, payment, and administration
in the United States. Changes to the program can also affect Medicare’s
total spending, which in turn affects the funds available for other national
spending priorities. Research and demonstrations allow CMS and Congress to explore the application of new ideas to Medicare in a targeted
manner. Absent these mechanisms, changes would be made on a much
larger scale, and the whole program and its beneficiaries would face the
ups and downs of refining the new approach. However, significant lead
time is required to design, implement, evaluate, and refine demonstrations.
Having results available when they are needed requires both forethought
and funding. In looking for tools to sustain, update, and improve Medicare
in the future, Congress will turn to the results of demonstrations to inform
their deliberations. The more robust, timely, and innovative demonstration
projects are, the better prepared Congress will be to consider potential
changes to Medicare.
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Appendix
CMS Research Budget, FY 2000 to Proposed FY 2009 (in millions of dollars)
2000

Research and
Demonstrations
Congressional
Earmarks
Real Choice Systems
Change Grants
Medicare Current
Beneficiary Survey
TOTAL RESEARCH

*

President’s proposed
FY 2009 budget.

A congressional earmark is a demonstration or research project with
a funding amount appropriated in
the statute. Generally, an earmarked
project is unique to a particular
participant or geographic area.

2001

$ 40.3 $ 39.6

2002

2003

2004

2005

$ 42.3

$ 15.5

$ 41.5

$ 44.7

2006

2007

2008

2009*

$ 31.1

$ 23.4

$ 25.0

$ 14.4

10.3

37.3

22.9

5.8

17.1

12.7

0.0

0.0

4.9

0.0

0.0

50.0

40.0

40.0

39.5

39.7

24.7

15.9

9.8

7.5

11.2

11.4

12.0

12.4

13.4

13.1

13.6

18.4

7.2

14.4

$ 61.8 $ 138.3

$ 117.2

$ 73.7

$ 111.5

$ 110.2

$ 69.4

$ 57.7

$ 46.9

$ 36.3

Note: Includes funds from the CMS Research Appropriation and selected sections of additional legislation such
as the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003; the Deficit Reduction Act of
2005; the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006; and the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007.
Funds in the Quality Improvement Organization budget and Informational Technology systems changes that
support research and demonstration activities are not included. Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey funding is
lower in FY 2008 due to forward funding in FY 2007 and partial year funding in 2008.
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Justification of Estimates for Appropriations Committees,” available at www.hhs.gov/budget/docbudget.htm; CMS, staff communication with author, April 2008.
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